3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

22 April 1959

Copy No. C 53

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN




DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
IT DECLASSITIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE
DATE

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003309





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*Tibet: Rebels in southeastern Tibet are being hard pressed by Communist forces using aircraft and artillery.

NO

rebel forces consider most of the southeast area lost. A large group of armed Khamba tribesmen and other Tibetans are reported to be camped near the Indian border. They are short of food and ammunition and are said to be under constant Chinese Communist attack. They hope to obtain permission to proceed into India near the point where the Dalai Lama entered.

communist China: Communist China may be preparing to produce the FARMER (MIG-19) twin-jet interceptor with Soviet assistance. Soviet fighter production experts, known to be in China, are affiliated with a department of the Soviet Engineering Directorate which has accounted for some of the sharp increase noted recently in Soviet military deliveries to China. Some of the Soviet production experts have been associated with a FARMER engine factory in the USSR.

(Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

*USSR-UAR: Cairo agreed on 14 April to accept delivery from the Soviet Union of two destroyers in the second quarter of 1959 and one destroyer in the third quarter. Cairo is also to receive delivery of some Soviet mine sweepers--probably four--at once, These deliveries apparently are to be made under a new Soviet-UAR arms deal recently completed. Details of this agreement are not known. The Soviet Union has already provided the UAR with two destroyers, nine submarines, six mine sweepers, and 37 motor torpedo boats.

No

2

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003309

Indonesia: The Indonesian Army is continuing its efforts to strengthen its political position and is exploring ways of curtailing the influence of the Indonesian Communist party. The army, meanwhile, continues to approach both Western and Soviet bloc sources for military supplies. Prime Minister Djuanda is expected to discuss present and future bloc aid programs when he visits Moscow this summer.)

(Page 2)

Japan: The contests between the ruling conservatives and the Socialists for the governorships of Tokyo, Osaka, Hokkaido, and Fukuoka in Japan's local elections on 23 April will provide a measure of relative conservative and Socialist strength. Prime Minister Kishi regards a conservative victory as essential. The results will have an impact on the position of Kishi's Liberal Democratic party in the June upperhouse elections. (Page 4)

III. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

(The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):)

- (1. There are as yet no clear indications of specific Soviet tactics at Geneva, but there have been several recent indications that the USSR will be prepared to discuss some issues other than a German peace treaty and Berlin, particularly security and disengagement proposals.)
- 2. The fact that the United States went ahead with a second C-130 high-altitude flight in spite of British representations has probably impressed Moscow as to the seriousness of US intentions on questions affecting air)

22 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

TOP SECRET

access rights. Moscow's propaganda reaction was sharper than over the first flight. However, its total handling of the matter still suggests the USSR will seek to avoid serious incidents in the air corridors in the near future while endeavoring to extract the maximum propaganda advantage.)

- (3. The USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future. However, the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with little or no advance warning.)
- 4. Indications of Soviet responses to possible Western actions in the event of turnover, harassment, or blockade remain consistent with the judgments stated in SNIE 100-2-59)
- (5. There were no major intelligence indications of Western allied diplomatic intentions, apart from information obtained through official contacts with US representatives.)
- 6. There are no significant changes in the West Berlin situation.

22 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

LATE ITEM

*USSR: Moscow's note of 21 April to Bonn, charging that measures to equip West German forces with nuclear weapons are designed to confront forthcoming East-West negotiations with a fait accompli, is a further Soviet move to discredit the Adenauer government and set the stage for Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in Europe in the talks. The warning that negotiations will be doomed to failure if Bonn persists in its rearmament program is another step in Moscow's effort to establish in advance the rationale and justification for unilateral actions regarding Berlin and a separate peace treaty with East Germany in the event the talks fail. By focusing attention on the controversial issue of arming West Germany with modern weapons, the Soviet leaders are seeking to sharpen differences among the Western allies on the eve of the foreign ministers' conference.

22 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China May Be Preparing to Produce MIG-19s
Communist
China, with Soviet assistance, is preparing to produce the
FARMER (MIG-19) twin-jet interceptor. Soviet personnel
from Aircraft Engine Plant 26 in Ufa, which has been pro-
ducing FARMER engines, now are in China. They are prob-
ably at Plant 410 in Mukden, which has been producing
engines for the MIG-17. Preparation may have been under
way for a considerable time;
Plant 410 was developing a 'new tech-
nology."
A possible production site for airframes is Plant 112 in Mukden, which produces the MIG-17 and is known to be producing a "new article." Another possibility is the Sian area, where there are several little-known plants connected with the aircraft industry and where Soviet technicians familiar with MIG-type aircraft have been identified.
At least three of the Soviet specialists involved have been sent to China by the department of the Soviet Engineering Directorate that has accounted for most of the sharp increase noted recently in Soviet military deliveries to China. This suggests that at least part of these increased shipments are plant equipment for production of FARMERS. The USSR no longer produces the FARMER, but Czechoslovakia is believed to have started serial production recently. About one and a half to two years would be required from the inception of the program until the Chinese could begin producing the FARMER in significant quantities.

TOP SECRET

Δ.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia

The expected departure of President Sukarno on 23 April for a two-month tour of Europe and Latin America has given rise to new rumors of political changes and maneuvers.

withdraw from the cabinet, thereby precipitating its collap and paving the way for the formation of a new army-domina cabinet and the banning of the Communist party.	se ited
Army Chief of Staff General Nasu tion has not yet decided to cooperate. Other speculation has been advanced as to possible army moves during Sukarno's absence, most of it, however, strongly implying Sukarno's prior knowledge or even his instructions. Nasution, in fact has indicated to American officials that he is still working closely with Sukarno and has no plans for an early move against the Communists.	ıs

Prime Minister Djuanda plans to visit the Soviet Union in late June or early July at the invitation of Moscow. Although this initially appeared to be a courtesy visit, Djuanda is now reported planning to discuss present and future aid programs with emphasis on arms.)

Meanwhile, an Indonesian Army purchasing mission, which has been shopping in Yugoslavia and the West since early March, is now believed in Czechoslovakia. Since the mission probably could not obtain in the West either the liberal credit terms or the quantities of materiel it was instructed to request, the bulk of its purchases are likely to come from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Ninety more Indonesian Air Force cadets are scheduled to leave soon for Czechoslovakia for two years' pilot training,

Some 70 to 150 air force personnel

SECRET

are reported already there undergoing pilot and technical training.

An Indonesian mission will leave for Peiping on 21 April to discuss utilization of \$20,000,000 of a \$40,000,000 credit extended by China last year. Approximately \$11,500,000 of the loan has been spent for a textile mill, and the amount now under negotiation has also been earmarked for the textile industry.	

SECRET __

Japanese Elections

Japan's top political leaders have injected national issues into the election campaign for important gubernatorial and municipal offices on 23 April. These issues include the Socialist leadership's recent identification of the party generally with the Chinese Communist position on Asian questions and the conservatives' policy of cooperation with the United States. This will be the first such contest between the ruling Liberal-Democratic party and the Socialist party since they were organized in 1955, and the outcome may have a band-wagon effect in the important June upper-house elections.

Primary political interest is centered on the campaigns for the governorships of the Tokyo metropolitan area, the island of Hokkaido, and Osaka and Fukuoka prefectures. The elections will hinge largely on personalities and local issues, and the outcome is likely to be close.

Prime encou	onservativ in Osaka Minister rage party	or Hokka Kishi's p	iido, co er s onal	uld have positio	an adve:	rse effec obably w	t on ould
ship.							
ı							

- CONFIDENTIAL

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003309